SPECIAL: Syria -- Nov 26-Dec 3, 2024
HTS & opposition take Aleppo city, doubling territory in 6 days
CONTENTS:
SPECIAL — HTS & Opposition offensive changes the game, as Assad’s regime crumbles in northwest Syria
SPECIAL — HTS & Opposition offensive changes the game, as Assad’s regime crumbles in northwestern Syria
By late-afternoon Syria-time today (December 3), the combined efforts of two major armed opposition offensives – Operation Deter Aggression and Operation Dawn of Freedom – are confirmed to have captured at least 237 cities, towns, villages and military bases from Syria’s regime. In doing so, in the space of six days, Syria’s armed opposition has more than doubled the territory under its control, with all of Idlib governorate captured, along with much of Aleppo governorate and a broad stretch of northern Hama governorate. HTS and opposition fighters have now reached Hama city, while also pushing east towards the strategic town of Ithriya in the desert south of Aleppo and east of Hama.
While specific casualty counts are impossible to determine for now, hundreds of combatants have been killed and injured. As many as 200 pro-regime soldiers and militiamen have also been captured and opposition groups have seized enough weaponry and ammunition to last months, if not years of fighting. These are truly game-changing developments, though the precise consequences for Syria overall, and for the regime’s survival, remain to be seen.
Though this dramatic surge in hostilities has been described by many as a “surprise offensive,” it was not in fact much of a surprise. In fact, the operation launched on Wednesday November 27 was originally intended to begin in mid-October. For several weeks, beginning in early-September, senior military leaders from a coalition of 10 armed factions based primarily in Idlib had been meeting to plan a major assault into western Aleppo. Their goal was to remove the regime’s expansive artillery launching zone west of Aleppo – from where it had sustained years of daily indiscriminate shelling of civilian communities – and create an opposition stand-off threat to Aleppo city.
According to two well-placed sources within that coalition, news of the plans leaked to Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, or MIT, prompting a swift and decisive Turkish intervention – including two meetings in Idlib and several in Turkey – that put the plans on hold.
At that point, the coalition had already chosen the “Deter Aggression” title, pilot social media pages had been established for the ‘Military Operations Command” (which was to effectively replace the long-running Fathul Mubeen umbrella) and journalists close to HTS and the Salvation Government’s Media Ministry had been briefed and told to prepare for a long-time embed. To make matters more complicated, at least eight 3-to-6-man cells from HTS’s elite Asaib al-Hamra (Red Bands) had just gained access into the regime-held Aleppo city in order to launch diversionary attacks as a ground assault got underway – according to a senior armed opposition source based in Idlib. Turkey’s order to call off the offensive created significant tensions, but it also triggered the return of Russian fighter jets to northwest Syria’s skies, with a four-day targeted air campaign (reported here and here) striking HTS and opposition targets across Idlib between October 14-17.
Despite the apparent foiling of their plans, the HTS-led coalition stood fast. It contained:
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
Ahrar al-Sham
Jaish al-Ahrar
Turkistan Islamic Party
Ansar al-Tawhid
Faylaq al-Sham
Jaish al-Nasr
Suqor al-Sham
Jaish al-Nukhba
Jaish al-Izzeh
Additional groups operating in close coordination, but officially outside the coalition include:
Jaish al-Muhajireen wal Ansar
Ansar al-Islam
In addition, a number of specialist units that ordinarily act as training fronts and which are extremely closely affiliated with (if not largely subsumed within) HTS are also on the frontlines, acting as force multipliers to HTS efforts. These include Xhemati Alban (Albanian), Fursan Tactical (Turkish), Yurtugh Tactical (Uyghur) and Muhojir Tactical (Uzbek).
In the weeks following Turkey’s intervention, tensions continued to escalate in northwest Syria, as the regime’s attacks on the region steadily intensified. While artillery shelling across northeastern Hama, western Aleppo, southern Idlib and northeastern Latakia all surged, the regime’s suicide drone campaign escalated to unprecedented levels – with 201 drones directed into civilian areas in the area in the five weeks that followed. That represented a near-tripling of the rate of attacks compared to the four months prior (the Syrian regime’s Russian-directed suicide drone campaign began in late-June 2024). Under increasing strain, civilians began to flee border areas, creating the kind of conditions that have historically encouraged offensive regime ground maneuvers.
The decision to launch the offensive was, I’m told, made on Monday November 25. Two days later, on Wednesday November 27, the HTS-led coalition launched Operation Deter Aggression. In the initial phase of the attack, at least three locally engineered “Qaysar” cruise missiles were launched onto regime frontline positions in Qabtan al-Jabal, Sheikh Aqil and Anjara – their explosions acting as a de facto equivalent of a suicide truck bomb. As those never-before-seen missiles were launched into the air, several swarms of suicide drones were launched at regime posts, tank hideouts and frontline lookout points by the newly formed drone unit, Kataib Shaheen (the Falcons Brigades). Guidance for those strikes was provided by a fleet of reconnaissance drones. The smaller munitions were directed into their targets by teams of drone operators who had been trained intensively in secret over the past year. Artillery and mortar shelling added to the wall of multi-layered munitions directed at regime frontlines – clearing the way for a ground assault on five parallel axes.
As the ground assault began, HTS’s Asaib al-Hamra cells inside Aleppo city were activated. Several conducted drive-by raids on regime checkpoints in the city’s western New Aleppo, Salah ad Din and Hamdaniyah districts, but one attacked a hurriedly convened emergency meeting involving senior commanders from the Syrian Army and Military Intelligence, as well as Russia’s military and the IRGC. The attack killed at least six people, including IRGC Brigadier General Kiomars Pourhashemi (Hajj Hashem).
Within 12hrs, the core initial goal of the offensive had been achieved, as regime frontlines repeatedly collapsed one after the other across the western Aleppo frontline. The opposition coalition appeared exhilarated by their rapid gains and although pushing towards Aleppo city had not been part of the initial plan, another new and largely untested HTS unit – Saraya al-Harari, or the Thermal Brigade – had been prepped to fight at nightfall. With at least 500 fighters at its disposal, Saraya al-Harari had been trained over the past two years to specialize specifically in night-time combat, with each and every one of its fighters equipped with assault rifles, sniper rifles and RPGs equipped with night-vision scopes. Their deployment onto the battlefield late on November 27 triggered disarray in regime ranks. Until now, darkness typically led to a temporary respite from fighting – not anymore.
As the sun rose on November 28, the HTS-led coalition had opened a whole new front, launching offensive maneuvers in southern Idlib, pushing into Dadikh and severing Syria’s vital north-south M5 highway connecting Aleppo with Damascus. Back up north, opposition forces had advanced to the point that Aleppo city was withing their firing range by nightfall. Saraya al-Harari were deployed back into action and by the following morning, the frontline had reached inside the city’s western suburbs – and by nightfall on November 29, Aleppo city had fallen.
Perhaps inspired by the HTS-led coalition, the Syrian National Army in northern Aleppo launched Operation Dawn of Freedom on November 30, seeking to take control of the Tel Rifaat pocket that has been held jointly for several years by the regime and the Syrian Democratic Forces. The fighting there has not been nearly as large-scale, but it has been deadly. As the SNA began probing operations, regime forces withdrew altogether, leaving the SDF in place – and Tel Rifat and all its surrounding areas fell on December 1.
In the days since, the HTS-led coalition has continued to push forward, thrusting south from Aleppo city into the regime’s strategic military zone in which Aleppo International Airport and four other airbases have been captured – plus the notorious defense factories, the Ramouseh Complex, the Military Academy and the military industrial complex in al-Safira. In addition to HTS’s development of special forces-type units like Asaib al-Hamra and Saraya al-Harari, the groups Kataib al-Shaheen drone unit has proven a hugely valuable force multiplier to the opposition offensive, with 10-20 precision strikes on regime frontline assets every day. At least three senior regime commanders have been killed in drone strikes in recent days too:
SAA Brigadier General Hisham al-Hakim
SAA Brigadier General Ayman Melhem
Military Intelligence provincial Hama chief, Brigadier General Uday Ghassah
By midday on November 30, the southern Idlib advance had expanded south into Hama where significant regime reinforcements led to brutal and intense fighting through December 1 and 2. By midday on December 3, the frontline in Hama had reached past the long-standing regime strongline, with opposition fighters in control of territory stretching from Halfaya to Taybat al-Imam, Souran, Maar Shahour, Khattab and Maardes and west to Kowkab. HTS and opposition fighters had reportedly reached the gates of Hama city by midday December 3. While Arabic social media had claimed sizeable Shia militia reinforcements had been dispatched to the Hama front, no clear evidence of that has emerged until now.
Confirmed captured cities, towns, villages and bases:
Aleppo:
Idlib:
Hama:
While regime ground forces seek to establish a defensive line just north of Hama city, Syrian and Russian aircraft as well as heavy artillery have launched an increasingly ferocious punishment campaign of strikes since November 30. In the past 36hrs alone, at least six hospitals have been hit in precision airstrikes, in addition to several schools, IDP camps and Aleppo University. Aleppo’s Christian district of Sulaymaniyah has been hit several times by Russian airstrikes.
Confirmed Regime and Russian air & artillery strikes on non-frontline targets:
Meanwhile, the extraordinary nature of HTS and opposition advances in the northwest have catalyzed anti-regime violence elsewhere in the country. Former opposition fighters across Daraa in the south have mobilized, storming police stations and local intelligence headquarters, disarming regime checkpoints, and launching attacks on regime troops. In Homs, former opposition fighters have launched a string of deadly attacks on regime forces, while in Deir ez Zour, the SDF’s Arab tribe-dominated Deir ez Zour Military Council has launched the ‘Battle of Return,’ seeking to capture a network of seven villages on the eastern bank of the Euphrates from which regime-aligned and Iranian-backed militias have been launching near-daily attacks on SDF positions, as well as rocket attacks on nearby U.S. bases. Though gradual and less expansive than events in Idlib, Aleppo and Hama, developments like this indicate that hostilities are developing a more national dynamic — a major threat to Assad’s credibility, and potentially his survival.'
As Aleppo city and hundreds of other municipalities settle into being controlled by HTS and other opposition factions, significant pressure will fall upon HTS and its semi-technocratic Salvation Government. Both actors have spent considerable resources in recent years seeking to demonstrate a new level of pragmatism and professionalism — framing their governance as part-and-parcel of Syria’s national revolution, not as a jihad or some kind of Islamic project. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani’s personal attempts to rebuild trust and credibility with Idlib’s Christian and Druze communities (including in rebuilding their places of worship, and sustaining a dialogue with their clerics) will need to expand into Aleppo and Hama if HTS is to avoid sharp criticism from abroad and isolation from within. The early signs have been encouraging, with HTS establishing a hot line in Aleppo for complaints, and issuing a string of public statements supporting the rights of all ethnic and religious communities. Aleppo’s churches have continued their services and celebrations as normal this past week. With the SNA’s entry into hostilities north of Aleppo, it is illustrative that HTS’s back-channel dialogue and negotiations with the SDF have been far more constructive and effective than with the SNA itself. In fact, reports continue to emerge that HTS personnel are intervening against SNA abuses — detaining SNA fighters and taking over local security, at the request of community notables.
In terms of governance more broadly, and service provision, HTS’s Emergency Response Committee (originally established to coordinate a reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic) has been deployed into newly captured areas, combing for unexploded munitions and issuing out directions for the Salvation Government’s broad spread of bodies to begin operations. The SSG’s Ministry of Development and Humanitarian Affairs has established a network of local coordinators, disseminating their contact details across social media. Ministries responsible for education, health, water, telecommunications, electricity and more have all begun work in newly captured areas — repairing damage and adding to pre-existing services, whether by constructing new phone lines, powering up old water stations, distributing food baskets and more.
That opposition forces have achieved such extraordinary gains fundamentally changes the balance of power in Syria’s crisis. In many ways, the past six days have turned the clocks in northwestern Syria back nearly a decade. The regime spent five years and an enormity of resources to wrestle back control of half of Aleppo city, and it’s just lost the entire city and more in the space of a few days. Far from being a consolidated victor in Syria, Assad and his regime now look profoundly weak. After several years of slow-moving normalization developments and talk of putting the crisis behind us, the fundamental assumptions that drove such policies have all been turned on their head. The HTS and opposition advance will end sooner or later and new frontlines will firm up, but the Syrian geopolitical chessboard has been reset and all stakeholders will be looking to reposition themselves in the coming days and weeks.
For Turkey, recent events have not been part of the plan, but if managed appropriately, they promise to strengthen Ankara’s hand significantly. After nearly a year of deliberations, backchannel talks, shuttle diplomacy and public messaging, Turkey’s openness to diplomatic re-engagement with Damascus collapsed this Fall. Despite considerable behind-scenes efforts by Iran, Iraq, Russia and the UAE, Assad would not budge on his maximalist demands for a Turkish military withdrawal from Syrian territory. That angered Russian President Vladimir Putin so much that Assad was summoned quietly to Moscow at least three times between July and October 2024, according to two sources close to the regime in Damascus. The third of those visits saw Assad – awkwardly – in Moscow as opposition forces entered Aleppo city on November 29. Having concluded Assad was not sufficiently interested in Turkey’s proposals, the Turkish delegation that traveled to Astana on November 11 therefore raised the prospect of a further unilateral Turkish incursion into northern Syria to combat the PKK. That was slammed by Russia, leaving Ankara in a corner.
On the regime’s side, recent developments have shone a light on the acute fragility of Assad’s regime. Despite years of intensive efforts to rebuild Syria’s military, reunite its disparate units and professionalize its officer class, Syrian troops disintegrated under pressure. Russian special forces were on the western Aleppo frontline, with at least one killed in an early ambush. So too were Hezbollah fighters, several of which were killed on Day 1 alone. Their ability to assist a Syrian military in complete disarray, however, appears to have been minimal – similar in a way to Russia’s initial struggle to translate its interventionary air campaign in Syria in late-2015 into on-the-ground gains by ill-disciplined, poorly trained and battle-fatigued Syrian troops. With intense fighting now digging in along several frontlines, the regime desperately needs manpower, and local reporting in Daraa, Damascus, Homs and the Qalamoun suggests regime checkpoints are stopping all men seeking to draft them into service.
While Iran and Hezbollah have undoubtedly been distracted by months of conflict with Israel, no substantive evidence has emerged to substantiate the unfounded rumors that their forces had departed Syria. In the northwest of Syria, Hezbollah and the IRGC have remained on their long-standing frontlines – including in Saraqeb, where Israeli airstrikes targeted them on November 8 (reported here). Far from having withdrawn or degraded its Syria posture in recent years, Russia’s assets in Syria have also remained much the same – whether in terms of ground forces, military police, mercenaries, as well as air and air defense assets. The one discernible effect of the war in Ukraine has been that Russia has shortened deployment times to Syria and reduced the ratio of its best trained officer class.
For the U.S., recent events in northwest Syria do not present a direct challenge or dilemma – hence the virtually meaningless statement issued by the National Security Council on November 30. Despite the obvious complications associated with a succesful HTS-led offensive, a sudden crisis for Assad’s regime should offer the U.S. and allies and partners with an opportunity to consider a concerted push on Syria diplomacy, but with Biden’s administration on its way out, the window to do so is very limited. More concretely therefore, the main consequence worthy of U.S. concern will be the inevitable vacuum that ISIS will now find for itself in central Syria now that the regime’s most capable military units have been deployed to Hama. ISIS is already well within an early resurgence in Syria, with the group on track to triple its attacks in 2024 compared to 2023. That recovery is thanks in very large part to ISIS’s ability to rebuild in the Syrian badiya, exploiting the regime’s lack of capacity in vast tracts of desert. That dynamic is set to worsen dramatically now – with predictable knock-on effects on the security in the U.S. and SDF-administered northeast.
In Europe, substantive discussions on Syria policy in recent months have been dominated by framing around refugees. Led by Italy, a group of at least 10 EU states have been actively exploring the potential establishment of ‘safe zones’ in regime-held Syria into which refugees could be returned. So driven by its desire to push a more proactive agenda, Italy just recently dispatched its former Syria special envoy, Stefano Ravagnan to be its Ambassador in Damascus. The basis for this entire initiative, which has now drawn in European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and to an extent, EU Foreign Policy chief Josep Borrell, is based on the assumption that Assad’s regime has consolidated its victory, is stable and represents a concrete ‘state’ with which to deal. Such assumptions have been burnt to the ground in recent days.
If the Italian quest to normalize the re-engagement with Damascus has suffered a humiliating blow, the Middle East’s agenda of wholesale normalization of Assad’s regime has been significantly undermined. Driven by a desire to bolster a strong state at the heart of the Middle East, regional governments sought to partner with Assad’s regime to resolve Syria’s long-running regional challenges such as the refugee crisis, terrorism, the captagon and drug trade and the country’s spiraling humanitarian crisis. While all those issues deteriorated markedly since, regional capitals continued to build upon their normalization approach, in part on the basis that Syria’s opposition had become meaningless and the Syrian state was the future. The regime’s dramatic collapse in the northwest in recent days should trigger a significant recalculation in Arab capitals – but don’t count on it.
Ultimately, the transformational events witnessed over the past six days were not in themselves a geopolitical strike by Turkey, and nor were they a crippling blow to Iran, Hezbollah or Russia resulting from events elsewhere. They were the result of a coalition of armed groups that have spent four years planning to resume the fight and choosing to do so despite the clear and well-known opposition from Turkey. The intensive work undertaken by HTS in particular since 2020 to develop a far greater level of military capability — particularly in terms of drone warfare, night-time combat, the development of special forces units and the establishment of indigenous weapons production oriented around rocket and missiles — has clearly made a qualitative difference on the battlefield. HTS and its coalition has also demonstrated a far greater level of operational security, command and control, and integrated warfare, utilizing multiple ground, air and stand-off assets simultaneously. On the other side of the line, the regime’s military apparatus appears to have stagnated.
The fact that the resulting opposition advance will now have generated profound geopolitical recalculations is more the result of stakeholders to Syria’s crisis having long discounted the goals and agendas of non-state actors inside the country. Any analysis of the events of recent days that fails to acknowledge how the roots of this escalation lie inside Syria and not in foreign capitals is missing the wood from the trees.
Conflict & Security:
US-Iran proxy actions
In the early hours of November 26, an Iranian proxy rocket attack targeted U.S. troops in the al-Omar base in Deir ez Zour, triggering interceptions.
Hours later, U.S. artillery strikes emanating from the al-Omar base targeted several Iranian proxy militia positions outside al-Mayadin.
U.S. forces based in the al-Tanf Garrison in southeast Syria downed an Iranian proxy drone on November 29. Local reporting was unclear as to whether the projectile was targeting the base, or Israel.
Later that day, a suspected U.S. airstrike targeted an Iranian proxy militia position in the desert outside al-Bukamal.
U.S. forces based in the MSS Conoco base in Deir ez Zour launched several artillery strikes targeting Iranian proxy militia positions in Marrat and Khasham across the Euphrates River on November 30.
Heavy U.S. airstrikes targeted a convoy of Iranian proxy militiamen in al-Mayadin in Deir ez Zour late on December 1. Local reporting indicated heavy casualties, but not a confirmed number.
On December 3, Iranian proxy militias launched several rockets at US troops in MSS Conoco, triggering interceptions. The attack came amid an SDF offensive seeking to take control of the ‘seven villages’ nearby.
Hours later, U.S. airstrikes targeted two separate Iranian proxy positions.
Israeli actions
At least six people were killed and 12 others injured in at least nine Israeli airstrikes that targeted bridges, checkpoints and road junctions – including in Wadi Khaled, al-Dabousiyah, Umm al-Haritayn and al-Aminiyah in Homs; in Jurud al-Qusaya and Jurud Nabi Shiyt in Rif Dimashq; and in al-Arida in southern Tartous, late on November 26.
Israeli airstrikes targeted the Jussiyah crossing, the al-Hoz bridge and the al-Jubaniyah bridge all in western rural Homs along the border with Lebanon in the early hours of December 1.
On December 2, Israeli airstrikes targeted the al-Jobaniyeh and al-Jawz crossings between the al-Qusayr district in Homs and neighboring Lebanon. Local reporting suggested Hezbollah-linked vehicles had been targeted but a casualty report was not available.
On December 3, an Israeli airstrike targeted a vehicle traveling on the main road leading to Damascus International Airport, killing one suspected Hezbollah commander.
ISIS
Two drivers were killed and two others injured when ISIS militants ambushed a small convoy of oil tankers linked to the regime’s Qaterji Company as they drove in a rural region of southern Hasakeh, on the Hasakeh-Raqqa highway on November 26.
ISIS militants ambushed a Fourth Division convoy as it departed Deir ez Zour en route to northwestern Syria on November 29. The ambush triggered clashes, but no casualties were confirmed.
ISIS militants ambushed an SDF vehicle driving through the village of al-Jorthi in eastern Deir ez Zour on November 28, triggering heavy clashes but no casualties were confirmed.
ISIS militants launched a brief attack on an SDF checkpoint in al-Huwayj in eastern Deir ez Zour on November 27, but it caused no casualties.
A suspected ISIS IED attack struck an SDF post in Dhiban in Deir ez Zour late on November 26, but it caused no casualties.
ISIS militants ambushed an SDF-linked oil tanker driving through rural western Deir ez Zour on December 2, causing light damage but no casualties.
SDF-linked Asayish forces detained a suspected local ISIS commander during a raid in al-Izbah in northern Deir ez Zour on December 2.
Russian fighter jets launched several airstrikes targeting ISIS cells in the al-Rusafa desert south of Raqqa and in the Jabal al-Bushra area of western Deir ez Zour on November 27.
Daraa
Violence linked to NW Syria hostilities
November 29
Locals across main towns of Daraa (including in Inkhil, al-Hirak, Tafas, Daraa al-Balad, Tel Shihab) took to the streets late on November 29 to celebrate opposition victories in northwestern Syria – triggering regime forces to open fire into the air in at least four different locations, including in Inkhil.
Amid high tensions, a statement issued by the Revolutionaries and Free Men of the Eastern Hauran was disseminated across Daraa announcing that insurgent violence would soon begin and that regime forces must withdraw from all military positions to avoid facing attacks.
November 30
local gunmen in Dael raided the local police headquarters and forcibly disarmed all regime police personnel, taking control of the building.
Later that day, regime military forces arrived on the main road between Dael and Khirbet al-Ghazaleh, setting up a large checkpoint to prevent movement into and out of the area.
Within an hour, local gunmen in Dael launched an attack on the checkpoint and engaged in a clash that left at least three combatants injured. That night, gunmen also attacked another Air Force Intelligence post in Khirbet al-Ghazaleh.
That day, gunmen in Ibtaa also mobilized, taking control of the town’s main streets and calling for the downfall of the regime. Shortly thereafter, the town’s Air Force Intelligence headquarters was abandoned, with all regime personnel leaving the town altogether.
In Tafas, local armed factions launched an attack on the regime’s military barracks, triggering heavy clashes.
Also that day, gunmen in Inkhil mobilized and launched an attack on the regime’s State Security headquarters, triggering heavy clashes that drew in additional gunmen from the neighboring town of Samlin. As the clashes escalated, regime forces from the 15th Brigade launched several artillery shells into Samlin.
In al-Maliha al-Gharbiya, two regime soldiers defected to local factions.
December 1
clashes continued in Samlin and Inkhil between local factions and regime personnel, including at a major checkpoint manned by State Security. The regime’s 15th Brigade launched another artillery barrage, but no casualties were caused.
Also that day, six regime soldiers were killed when gunmen on motorbikes launched a raid on their checkpoint outside Khirbet al-Ghazaleh.
Another regime checkpoint located just east of Jassem was reportedly abandoned.
Late on December 1, local gunmen mobilized in al-Nahta, taking to the streets, assuming control of roadways, and declaring their support for the opposition offensive in the north.
In al-Musayfirah, local gunmen raided the regime intelligence headquarters, disarming all personnel and threatening to launch attacks on them if they engaged in any activities outside the building.
In Dael, local gunmen raided the police headquarters, also disarming all personnel and threatening to launch attacks if they deployed onto the streets.
Also on December 1, an umbrella group of former opposition factions in Daraa – identifying as ‘Operations of Southern Syria’ – issued a public statement announcing a general mobilization and declaring a start to insurgent attacks on regime forces.
December 3:
Local gunmen from the neighboring villages of Jade and Sur in Lajat district launched attacks on two regime checkpoints, triggering heavy clashes involving artillery and mortar fire.
Local gunmen in Khirbet al-Ghazaleh ambushed a regime military vehicle with an IED, but casualties were not confirmed.
Other violence
A local armed faction leader, Mohammed al-Zoubi, was killed along with two more of his men, while several more were injured when unidentified gunmen launched an attack on his home in Tafas on November 28. The attack utilized an IED, several RPGs and assault rifle fire.
Late on November 29, funmen loyal to al-Zoubi engaged in heavy clashes in Tafas with gunmen loyal to Bassem al-Jalmawi (aka Abu Kinan al-Qasir), who stood accused of involvement in the attack the previous day. Hours later, additional clashes erupted between the rival factions in the village of Bayt Arah, resulting in at least one injury.
The bodies of two men, bound and executed, were discovered in a vehicle near the village of Tabneh in northern Daraa on December 2. Local reporting later identified them men as members of an armed group based in Jassem.
One man linked to drug smuggling was shot dead by unidentified assassins in Inkhil on November 26.
One man was shot dead by unidentified assassins in Tafas on November 29.
One man, identified as Ehsan al-Jahmani, was shot dead and another man was injured in an attack by unidentified assassins in Nawa on November 28.
One young man, Osama al-Haj Ali was shot dead by unidentified assassins in front of his home in Jassem on November 29.
One man, identified locally as Hassan Awad al-Masayid, was shot and injured by unidentified assassins on the main road linking Taybeh and Kahil in eastern Daraa on November 27.
One man, identified as Ahmed al-Hariri, was shot and injured by unidentified assassins in al-Hirak late on December 2.
Central Committee militiamen launched a raid on the home of Ammar al-Nusayrat in Ibtaa late on December 2, seeking his arrest in relation to several criminal cases – but a clash erupted, involving grenades and machine guns. Local reporting claimed multiple civilian casualties, but Nusayrat eventually surrendered.
The following day, Nusayrat was executed by a firing squad in Tafas.
One man, identified as Rifat al-Labad, was kidnapped by unidentified gunmen in al-Sanamayn on November 29.
The following day, Labad’s corpse was discovered having been executed on the main road between al-Quniyah and al-Sanamayn.
Regime-aligned Central Committee militiamen launched a raid on a string of farms in Izraa on November 27, detaining two men on suspicion of involvement in recent kidnappings in the area.
Two days later, on November 29, both men – identified as Thaluj al-Hussein and Uday al-Hussein – were released in exchange for Ahmed al-Hariri, who had been kidnapped on November 23.
A man identified as Abdulaziz al-Zoubi was kidnapped by unidentified gunmen on a rural stretch of the Daraa-Damascus highway on November 28.
He was released on December 1.
Syrian regime forces shot down an unidentified drone over the skies of Ibtaa on November 30. Engineers later detonated the drone, which contained an explosive munition.
Homs
On November 29, armed gunmen in Talbiseh launched an attack on a regime checkpoint on the main bridge in the town, forcing regime forces to flee. No casualties were confirmed.
The following day, gunmen based in Talbiseh ambushed a regime military convoy passing by the town en route to Hama, triggering heavy clashes in which two soldiers were injured. That day, gunmen in the town also launched attacks on the local council headquarters, the regime ‘al-Jisr’ checkpoint, the Military Intelligence headquarters. A large portrait of Assad was torn down and burned.
Late on November 30, six Iranian proxy militiamen were killed when gunmen from Talbiseh ambushed their convoy as it drove through the nearby village of al-Farhaniyah.
Regime intelligence personnel deployed into al-Qusayr on November 30 and launched an arrest campaign targeting men suspected of preparing to launch pro-opposition protests and attacks in solidarity with the opposition offensive in the north.
Suwayda
A regime military officer was shot dead and another with him was injured in an ambush by unidentified gunmen in the town of Umm Shahma east of Suwayda city on November 29.
The following day, three Bedouin gunmen and one regime soldier were killed in a heavy clash outside Umm Shahma that began as regime forces launched a raid on suspects linked to the attack the previous day.
A security guard at a water well was shot dead by unidentified assassins in rural southeastern Suwayda on November 26.
One civilian was shot dead by unidentified assassins in Suwayda town center on November 26.
Unidentified gunmen set up an ambush position on the Suwayda-Damascus highway late on December 2, conducting three separate attacks – targeting two vehicles and one motorbike. While each attack involved machine gunfire, no casualties were confirmed.
In a statement issued on November 28, the Druze ‘Local Forces’ militia declared its support and solidarity for the HTS and opposition offensive in northwestern Syria, labeling it part of the revolution’s effort to overthrow Assad’s regime.
Raqqa & Hasakeh
One regime officer was killed and another injured in an attack by unidentified gunmen in Qamishli, Hasakeh on December 2.
SDF forces launched a cross-line incursion into the SNA-held village of al-Waybdi west of Tel Abyad on November 27, triggering heavy clashes but no confirmed casualties.
Local reporting confirmed that regime forces stationed in al-Rusafa and al-Zamla areas of souther Raqqa, as well as at the al-Thawra oil field, had withdrawn from their positions on November 30, allegedly transferring their control over to the SDF.
Three SDF fighters were killed in a Turkish drone strike that struck their vehicle as it drove along the M4 highway outside Qamishli on December 2.
A Turkish drone strike targeted an SDF fighter traveling on a motorbike in the village of al-Dibs outside Ain Issa in Raqqa on November 28, killing him.
A Turkish drone strike targeted an SDF checkpoint in the Abu Rasayn area in northwestern Hasakeh on December 2.
[Pre-offensive] HTS-controlled NW Syria
Four civilians were killed and 14 others injured in a heavy regime artillery barrage that targeted Ariha in southern Idlib late on November 26. Amongst the sites hit was a boarding school for young children.
Later that night, heavy regime shelling also struck al-Atareb in western Aleppo.
On November 27, regime shelling targeted Darat Izza in western Aleppo.
[Pre-offensive] Northern Aleppo
SDF-linked Manbij Military Council (MMC) fighters launched a cross-line incursion into SNA-held village of Umm Julud in rural Manbij on November 26, triggering heavy clashes that later spread to the village of al-Hamran. Retaliatory SNA shelling also struck several areas in Umm Julud and Arab Hassan, nearby.
On November 26, SNA fighters associated with Ahrar al-Sham ambushed a convoy of SDF-linked fighters moving across a field along the Hamran frontline, resulting in several casualties.
Hours later, two civilians were injured when SDF-linked militiamen shelled the SNA-held village of Hamran.
SDF-linked fighters and SNA factions exchanged artillery shelling along the Marea and Harbel frontlines on November 26, but no casualties were confirmed.
On November 27, amid the HTS-led offensive in western Aleppo, SDF-linked MMC forces launched a cross-line incursion into SNA-held areas along the Marea frontline, triggering heavy clashes.
Later that day, SNA factions launched several artillery barrages targeting MMC positions in the villages of Umm Julud and Arab Hassan.
Deir ez Zour
Arab-majority units from within the SDF’s Deir ez Zour Military Council launched a major offensive seeking to capture the string of seven regime-controlled villages (al-Hussainiya, Marrat, Hatlah, Khasham, al-Salihiyah, Tabiyah and Mazloum) on the eastern bank of the Euphrates. The offensive, named Battle of Return, began in the early hours of December 3 and resulted in heavy fighting throughout the day.
Heavy clashes erupted between SDF fighters and a group of unidentified gunmen in the town of Muhaymidah in western Deir ez Zour on November 28.
Armed tribesmen from al-Baggara confederation gathered in western Deir ez Zour on December 2 threatening to launch an offensive into a string seven regime-held villages along the Euphrates River: Hatlah, Marrat, al-Hussainiyah, al-Salihita, Tabiyah, Mazloum and Khasham.
Politics & Diplomacy
Bashar al-Assad returned to Syria late on November 30, following an unreported visit to Russia. Soon thereafter, he made official phone calls with leaders from Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – in which he declared his ability and plans to defeat “terrorists” in the north.
The following morning, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi arrived in Damascus on December 1 amid persistent fighting in northern Syria. He held talks with Bashar al-Assad in the Presidential Palace.
The Iraqi government announced on November 30 that it had fully closed its entire national border with Syria, amid persistent hostilities in northern Syria.
On November 30, the U.S. National Security Council issued a statement on escalation in Syria:
We are closely monitoring the situation in Syria and have been in contact over the last 48 hours with regional capitals. The Assad regime’s ongoing refusal to engage in the political process outlined in UNSCR 2254, and its reliance on Russia and Iran, created the conditions now unfolding, including the collapse of Assad regime lines in northwest Syria. At the same time, the United States has nothing to do with this offensive, which is led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a designated terrorist organization. The United States, together with its partners and allies, urge de-escalation, protection of civilians and minority groups, and a serious and credible political process that can end this civil war once and for all with a political settlement consistent with UNSCR 2254. We will also continue to fully defend and protect U.S. personnel and U.S. military positions, which remain essential to ensuring that ISIS can never again resurge in Syria.
On December 1, the U.S., UK, France and Germany issued a joint statement on the escalation in northwestern Syria:
We are closely monitoring developments in Syria and urge de-escalation by all parties and the protection of civilians and infrastructure to prevent further displacement and disruption of humanitarian access. The current escalation only underscores the urgent need for a Syrian-led political solution to the conflict, in line with UNSCR 2254.